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Lost in the App Store: The State of the 
Canadian Game App Economy
David B. Nieborg, Chris young, & Daniel Joseph
University of Toronto
ABSTRACT 
This commentary discusses the political economy of apps. The authors found that Canadian-
made game apps are notably absent in the Canadian App Store. This should be both worrying
and surprising, as Canada has a relatively sizable game industry. While policy conversations
on digital transformation focus on emerging technology, the authors point toward the power
and politics of digital platforms as one of the key issues preventing growth in the Canadian
digital economy.
Keywords  Cultural industries policy; Ownership (concentration/competition); Apps;
Platforms; Games
RÉSUMÉ
Ce commentaire discute de l’économie politique des applications. Les auteurs ont observé
que les applis de jeu fabriqués au Canada sont absents de l’App Store canadien. Cette
situation devrait surprendre et inquiéter, puisque le Canada a une industrie du jeu
relativement grande. Les conversations sur les politiques relatives à la transformation
numérique portent en grande partie sur les technologies émergentes, mais les auteurs
tiennent à souligner que le pouvoir et les politiques relatifs aux plateformes numériques sont
parmi les raisons clés pour lesquelles l’économie numérique au Canada ne croît pas autant
qu’elle le pourrait.
Mots clés  Politiques sur les industries culturelles; Propriété (concentration/concurrence);
Applications; Plateformes; Jeux
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today, virtually all modes of cultural production are subject to the process of “plat-
formization”: a series of changes in market structures, governance frameworks, and
infrastructures set by U.S.-based platform companies such as Google and apple
(Nieborg & Poell, 2018). Not only are platforms at the core of these institutional shifts,
they afforded new industrial practices, such as live-streaming and podcasting. Equally
important, these reconfigurations impact, and are impacted by, shifts in cultural con-
sumption, labour, and citizenship (van  Dijck, Poell, & De  Waal, 2018). in the 2018
National Digital and Data Consultations (NDDC), the Government of Canada (2018)
acknowledged the impact of this digital transformation, which we argue is very much
a platform-driven process. the consultations highlight 1)  trust and privacy, 2)  the fu-
ture of work, and 3)  innovation and competitiveness in the digital economy. this article
focuses on the latter two issues and points to some glaring omissions, particularly the
politics and power shifts associated with the process of platformization. to illustrate
the contours of platform power, we focus on app stores, the virtual marketplaces
owned and operated by Google and apple. app stores, Morris and Murray (2018) pro-
pose in the introduction to their recent anthology, have become powerful “infrastruc-
tural intermediaries” (p.  15), which provide access to mundane but increasingly vital
software expected to constitute a U.S.$95-billion global market in 2020.
Within the global app economy, games have carved out a special position since
they represent the most economically viable app genre. Since its inception, the digital
game industry has always been “platform native,” that is, dependent on the technology,
terms, and business models of platform operators such as Sony and Nintendo. this ex-
plains why the game industry has been at the forefront in the emerging field of platform
studies (Montfort & Bogost, 2009). therefore, to get a sense of the impact of plat-
formization and economic trends affecting the wider cultural industries, the game in-
dustry often functions as the proverbial canary in the coal mine. in this article, we argue
that the current state of the Canadian game app economy should worry all industry
stakeholders, including policymakers, industry organizations, and game developers. as
part of our ongoing research on the political economy of apps, we performed an eco-
nomic X-ray of the Canadian version of apple’s ioS (apple) app Store and found that
Canadian-made and -owned game apps are notably absent. this should be surprising,
as Canada has a relatively sizable games industry that exists in large part due to large
industrial investments and tax credit programs from provincial and federal govern-
ments. Before offering some more depth to our claims and suggesting policy interven-
tions, let us first offer some context on the Canadian game industry and app economy.
A multitude of apps
Developing and publishing games can be incredibly lucrative. Blockbuster titles, such
as Clash of Clans, Red Dead Redemption 2, and League of Legends, generate profits in
the hundreds of millions of dollars. Growth figures for the wider game industry are
constantly revised upwards. this growth is largely the result of accessible tools and a
proliferation of game platforms, particularly mobile phones, which resulted in a much
broader addressable global audience (Nieborg, 2016).
in theory, an individual Canadian game developer has the ability to develop and
distribute a game app that can be downloaded and played by billions around the world.
in practice, however, cultural production is, and always has been, a very high-risk
proposition. if one follows the reasoning outlined in the National Digital and Data
Consultations, one might be tempted to point to technological complexity as the main
source of these risks. after all, the NDDC’s discussion paper states that “Canadian firms
are slow adopters of new technology” (Government of Canada, 2018, para.  6). our ex-
periences with Canadian game developers suggest otherwise. Game developers have
been at the forefront of constant innovation for decades.
What Canadian game developers are currently faced with is of a different order
that is missing from the government’s discussion paper: an extremely uneven playing
field. the paper acknowledges that Canadians “do not fully reap the rewards in the
global marketplace” (para.  8), but stops short of calling out one of the main culprits,
platform companies. let us be blunt: Canadian content developers active in the plat-
form economy face an economic deck that is heavily stacked against them. Particularly
in the app economy, competition is fierce. lowering the barriers to market entry may
have opened the doors to innovative ideas, but it also means increased market com-
petition. Every week, hundreds of new game apps are released in Google’s Play Store
and apple’s ioS app Store. Before we further discuss the role of platform power and
politics in the digital economy, let us offer an exploratory case study that illustrates
our critique.
Surveying the Canadian App Store
With over 21,000 workers directly employed in the game industry, Canada is in the
global top five in terms of employment. according to the Entertainment Software
association of Canada, in 2017 there were 596 active game studios in the country, mak-
ing a $3.7-billion GDP contribution (Entertainment Software association of Canada,
2017). to investigate the competitiveness of Canadian app developers, we surveyed
the Canadian instance of apple’s ioS app Store. We got access to a proprietary financial
dataset that lists “direct” app revenue generated from 2015 to 2017. Direct revenue is
any income generated through app sales (i.e., premium apps) and via in-app purchases
(i.e., microtransactions, such as virtual currency or items).
our dataset is limited to daily, title-level data for the top 100 apps. a  second limita-
tion is the exclusion of any indirect app-related revenue, such as income from advertising.
our observations therefore concern relative trends rather than absolute observations of
the total Canadian game app economy. that said, we believe that these financial figures
give a good sense of wider economic patterns, particularly considering that the top-per-
forming apps—those apps present in our top-100 list—tend to be free of advertising.
a  third limitation of our study is the absence of any direct revenue generated by
Canadian app developers outside of the Canadian ioS app Store. We received this infor-
mation from a U.S.-based research firm, which collects financial data directly from pay-
ment providers, such as credit card companies and payment intermediaries. We coded
our dataset to account for several aspects related to ownership, such as the location of
the developer and the publisher. in our coding we used financial and government data-
bases, company websites, social media, and news articles to cross-reference coded data.
to give a sense of the amount of direct revenue, the top 100 game apps in the Canadian
ioS app Store raked in U.S.$140, $156, and $166  million in the years 2015, 2016, and 2017.
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Here we see a clear pattern of revenue growth. at the same time, we observe a very
skewed pattern of direct revenue distribution: the top 100 apps generate 85  percent of
all direct revenue. are Canadian game companies in the top 100 and thus able to create
and capture value in the Canadian app economy? the short answer is no.
the top grossers in the Canadian app Store are mostly incumbents. Game apps
such as Candy Crush Saga, Clash of Clans, and Game of War have a remarkable staying
power. Canadian apps accounted for 0.5  percent of the total direct revenue in 2017, a
paltry U.S.$900,000, as compared with U.S.-developed and owned apps, which earned
U.S.$59  million. Even if these figures primarily concern in-app revenue, the difference
is stark. Between 2015 and 2017 we only found five apps developed in Canada that
were generating significant direct revenue. in terms of the Canadian ability to capture
value in the app store (i.e., by companies based in Canada, where their profits are
taxed), we observe a similar trend. as shown in table 1, whereas the United States and
China captured 80  percent of direct app store revenue in 2017, Canada captured 0.1  per-
cent. We found only two game apps that are both made and owned by Canadian com-
panies: Bud Farm: Grass Roots and Trailer Park Boys: Greasy Money.
Table 1: Value capture based on iOS App Store revenue in top 100
*All revenue figures are in U.S.$ millions.
Policy suggestions
our initial numbers illustrate that the current approach to support the game industry,
via tax credits, eventually leads to the exportation of value, to precarious labour con-
ditions for local workers, and ironically, to less future revenue collected in taxes. this
is largely due to how easy it is to engage in labour arbitrage to cheaper labour markets
with high-tech skilled work, for fixed capital costs in the game industry are minimal
compared to other industrial sectors. the politics of value capture by foreign capital is
made crystal clear by our initial analysis. the profits generated by local Canadian sub-
sidiaries are paid out as dividends to the foreign-owned parent companies. to ensure
economic sustainability and content diversity, policy interventions should therefore
not solely rely on tax breaks. Currently, tax breaks in the game industry amount to
nothing less than corporate welfare, mostly for U.S.-based companies.
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2015 2016 2017
Country Percent Revenue* Percent Revenue Percent Revenue
United States 44 $62.3 52 $81.7 45 $73.9
China 4 $6.1 35 $54.3 34 $57
Japan 27 $37.3 3 $3.9 6 $9.9
South Korea 2 $3.2 2 $3.6 4 $6.2
Australia 0.2 $0.4 0.3 $0.6 2 $3.7
Russia 0 $0 0.5 $0.9 2 $3.7
United Kingdom 14 $20.5 0 $0 1 $2.4
Finland 0 $0 0.3 $0.6 0.2 $0.4
Canada 0.8 $1.2 0.3 $0.5 0.1 $0.3
Israel 0.2 $0.3 1 $1.8 0 $0
the NDDC’s discussion paper does not speak to any of these issues. yes, the future
of work is discussed, albeit in a very narrow way, as are trust and privacy. What we find
is missing are issues pertaining to worker rights, which would serve as a countermea-
sure to exploitative, opportunistic practices by transnational media corporations. to
be fair, a critical political economic stance is not to be expected from a discussion paper
that primarily draws from U.S. think thanks and consultancy businesses, and mimics
the ahistorical, neoliberal rhetoric of North american business school scholars.
Furthermore, the influence of U.S. capital is not so much about (supporting) pro-
duction, but about distribution and marketing. Content quota, similar to deals made
with Netflix in Europe, will not be of any help in the app store. it is not the availability
of (Canadian) apps that is the issue, but their visibility. this leaves us with three po-
tential policy instruments.
First, supporting local cultural intermediaries. research on independent game
production, one of the most promising breeding grounds for Canadian game content,
points to the importance of informal, non-profit-oriented local networks of cultural
organizations that support independent development in all its facets (Parker, Whitson,
& Simon, 2018). Next to supporting development, active financial support for inter-
mediaries free from U.S. control can assist with distribution- and marketing-related
opportunities.
Second, on a related note, different forms of financial support (be they tax breaks
or grants) should be as much tailored to supporting production as to circulation (i.e.,
distribution and marketing). you can make great (Canadian) games, but if nobody
knows about them, what’s the point? right now, provincial government organizations
such as ontario Creates support game development through tax credits and funds
similar to the interactive Digital Media Fund, which has been central to the develop-
ment of independent game production in ontario (Joseph, 2013; ontario Creates, 2019;
Parker & Jenson, 2017). yet no current programs exist that prioritize the funding and
creation of distribution infrastructures and platforms that ensure a level of Canadian
economic and technological sovereignty. Some measure of circulation support that
prioritizes marketing and networking exists in Europe; noteworthy here is Finland’s
success via direct developer and academic support. Canadian government organiza-
tions such as ontario Creates do support similar efforts in the form of “Global Market
Development” and “Marketing Development.” yet more structural solutions are re-
quired to compete against global, transnational incumbents (Parker et  al., 2018).
related to this, if there is one question in the NDDC discussion paper we want to see
much more data on, it is “How do we best protect the intellectual property of entre-
preneurs in an era of increasingly digital innovation and invention and support busi-
nesses as they develop new products and services for domestic and global markets?”
this is a policy area that has not been explored in depth since the Science Council of
Canada proposed the creation of the trans-Canada Computer Communications
Network in 1971 (Joseph, 2018).
third, and the most ambitious suggestion, is to directly address platform power
and politics. apple’s app Store is curated by anonymous apple employees rather than
via algorithms. this means that there is room for government agencies to push those
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curators to be more sensitive to Canadian-made content and promote Canadian intel-
lectual property within the app store. We believe that the political will for this is grow-
ing, as the question of visibility and discoverability is also at the core of the Canadian
radio-television and telecommunications Commission’s recent request for legislation
that expands its regulatory powers in regards to innovation, the social and cultural im-
portance of digital media, and the ability of Canadians to find and discover Canadian
content (CrtC, 2019). although we recognize that these interventions require signifi-
cant political willpower and a clear long-term vision on the Canadian game industry,
they are crucial to ensure that Canadian game apps not get lost in the app store.
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